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Abstract
A fundamental property of today’s cellular architecture—in
order to receive service, phones uniquely identify themselves
to towers and thus to operators—is now a cause of major
privacy violations. Over the past two years it has become
clear that operators have sold and leaked identity and location
data of hundreds of millions of mobile users.
In this paper, we examine how to improve privacy in mod-
ern mobile networks. We take an end-to-end perspective on
today’s cellular architecture and find key points of decoupling
that enable a new type of operator to offer privacy-enhanced
service with no changes to physical infrastructure and without
direct cooperation from existing operators.
We describe Pretty Good Phone Privacy (PGPP) and
demonstrate how our modified backend stack (EPC) works
with real phones to provide ordinary yet privacy-preserving
connectivity. We explore inherent privacy and efficiency trade-
offs in a simulation of a large metropolitan region. We show
how PGPP maintains today’s control overheads while signifi-
cantly improving user identity and location privacy.
1 Introduction
Cellular phone and data networks are an essential part of
global communications infrastructure. In the United States,
there are 129 cellular subscriptions for every 100 people and
the total number of cellular subscriptions worldwide now
stands at over 7.9 billion [5]. Unfortunately, today’s cellular
architecture embeds privacy assumptions of a bygone era. In
decades past, providers were highly regulated and centralized,
few users had mobile devices, and data broker ecosystems
were undeveloped. As a result, except for law enforcement
access to phone records, user privacy was generally preserved.
Protocols for cell communication embed an assumption of
trusted hardware and infrastructure [2], and specifications for
cellular backend infrastructure contain few formal prescrip-
tions for preserving user data privacy. The result is that the
locations of all users are constantly tracked as they simply
carry a phone in their pocket, without even using it.
Privacy violations by carriers. In the last two years it has
been extensively reported that mobile carriers have been sell-
ing and leaking mobile location data and call metadata of
hundreds of millions of users [18, 19, 39, 67, 71]. This be-
havior appears to have been legal and has left mobile users
without a means of recourse due to the confluence of a dereg-
ulated industry, high mobile use, and the proliferation of data
brokers in the landscape. As a result, in many countries every
mobile user can be physically located by anyone with a few
dollars to spend. This privacy loss is ongoing and is indepen-
dent of leakage by apps that users choose to install on their
phones (which is a related but orthogonal issue).
While this major privacy issue has long been present in
the architecture, the practical reality of the problem and lack
of technical countermeasures against bulk surveillance is be-
yond what was known before. However there is a fundamental
technical challenge at the root of this problem: even if steps
were taken to limit the sale or disclosure of user data, such
as by passing legislation, the cellular architecture generally
and operators specifically would still seemingly need to know
where users are located in order to provide connectivity. Thus
users must trust that network operators will do the right thing
with respect to privacy despite not having done so to date.
Architectural, deployable solution. We aim to remedy this
state of affairs by identifying and leveraging points of de-
coupling in the architecture. Our solution is designed to be
deployed by Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs),
where the MVNO operates the evolved packet core (EPC)
while the base stations (eNodeBs) are operated by a Mobile
Network Operator (MNO). This presents us with architectural
independence as the MVNO can alter its core functionality,
so long as the EPC conforms to LTE/5G standards. Our ap-
proach is made feasible by the industry-wide shift toward
software-based EPCs.
In our approach, users are protected even against tracking
by their own carrier (the MVNO). We decouple network con-
nectivity from authentication and billing, which allows the
carrier to run EPC services that are unaware of the identity or
location of their users but while still authenticating them for
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network use. We shift authentication and billing functionality
to outside of the cellular core and separate traditional cellular
credentials from credentials used to gain global connectivity.
Since it will take time for infrastructure and legislation to
change, our work is explicitly not clean slate. In addition, we
assume that existing industry players are unlikely to adopt
new technologies or have an interest in preserving user pri-
vacy unless legal remedies are instituted. As a result, we
consider how privacy can be added on top of today’s mobile
infrastructure solely by new industry entrants (i.e., MVNOs).
Contributions. We describe our prototype implementation,
Pretty Good Phone Privacy (PGPP). In doing so, we examine
several key challenges in achieving privacy in today’s cell
architecture. In particular, we consider: 1) which personal
identifiers are stored and transmitted within the cellular in-
frastructure; 2) which core network entities have visibility
into them (and how this can be mitigated); 3) which entities
have the ability to provide privacy and with what guarantees;
and 4) how we can provide privacy while maintaining com-
patibility with today’s infrastructure and without requiring
the cooperation of established providers.
We show PGPP’s impact on control traffic and on user
anonymity. We show that by altering the network coverage
map we are able to gain control traffic headroom compared
with today’s networks; we then consume that headroom in
exchange for improved anonymity. We analyze the privacy
improvements against a variety of common cellular attacks,
including those based on bulk surveillance as well as targeted
attacks. We find that PGPP significantly increases anonymity
where there is none today. We find that an example PGPP
network is able to increase the geographic area that an attacker
could believe a victim to be within by ~1,200% with little
change in control load.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We conduct a measurement study to demonstrate privacy
leakage that exists in today’s mobile networks (§3).
• We design a new architecture that decouples connectivity
from authentication and billing functionality, allowing
us to alter the identifiers used to gain connectivity (§5.1)
and enable PGPP-based operators to continue to authen-
ticate and bill users (§5.1) without identifying them.
• We adapt existing mechanisms to grow control traffic
broadcast domains, thus enhancing user location privacy
while maintaining backwards compatibility (§5.2).
• We quantify the impacts of PGPP on both user privacy
and network control traffic through simulation (§6) and
demonstrate PGPP’s feasibility in a lab testbed.
2 Background
Here we provide a brief overview of the cellular architec-
ture and describe the inherent privacy challenges. For simplic-
ity we focus on 4G LTE, though the fundamental challenges
exist in 5G (discussed in §4.2) as well as legacy standards.
E-UTRAN EPC
MME
HSS
S-GW P-GW
eNodeB
eNodeB
Control
Authentication
Connectivity
PGPP-GW
PGPP
UE
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UE
Figure 1: Simplified LTE architecture with and without PGPP.
PGPP decouples authentication and connectivity credentials
and shifts authentication to a new, external entity, the PGPP-
GW. Details of the PGPP-GW are found in §5.1.
2.1 Cellular architecture overview
The 4G LTE architecture can be divided into two areas:
the Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-
UTRAN), which is responsible for radio access; and the
Evolved Packet Core (EPC), which includes the entities re-
sponsible for authentication and connectivity to the network
core. Figure 1 shows a simplified architecture for both con-
ventional cellular as well as with PGPP. PGPP moves authen-
tication and billing to a new entity, the PGPP-GW, that is
external to the EPC. We detail PGPP’s specific changes in §5.
We include a glossary of cellular terms in Appendix B.
E-UTRAN. The E-UTRAN is the network that facilitates
connectivity between user devices (UEs)—commonly a cell
phone with a SIM card installed—and the serving base station
(eNodeB). The E-UTRAN is responsible for providing UEs a
means of connecting to the EPC via eNodeBs.
EPC. The EPC is the core of the cellular network and in-
cludes entities that provide authentication, billing, voice, SMS,
and data connectivity. The EPC entities relevant to our discus-
sion are the Mobility Management Entity (MME), the Home
Subscriber Server (HSS), and the Serving and Packet Data
Network Gateways (S-GW and P-GW, respectively). The
MME is the main point of contact for a UE and is responsible
for orchestrating mobility and connectivity. UEs authenticate
to the network by sending an identifier that is stored in the
SIM to the MME. The HSS is then queried to verify that
the UE is a valid subscriber. Once the UE is authenticated,
the MME assigns the UE to an S-GW and P-GW, which of-
fer an IP address and connectivity to the Internet. Note that
LTE networks can include many copies of these entities and
contain many more entities; however, for the purposes of our
discussion this simplified model suffices.
MVNOs. We design our solution to be implemented by
a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO). MVNOs are
virtual in that they offer cellular service without owning the
infrastructure itself. Rather, MVNOs pay to share capacity on
the infrastructure that an underlying carrier operates. MVNOs
can choose whether they wish to operate their own LTE core
entities such as the MME, HSS, and P-GW, which is the type
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of operation we propose. MVNOs that run their own core net-
work are often called “full” MVNOs. Critically, our architec-
ture is now feasible as the industry moves toward “whitebox”
eNodeBs that connect to a central office that is a datacenter
with virtualized EPC services, as in the Open Networking
Foundation’s M-CORD project [26] and in the upcoming 5G
standard. Recent work has shown that dramatic performance
gains are possible using such newer architectures [54, 55].
2.2 Identity in the cellular architecture
Maintaining user privacy has long been challenging in cel-
lular networks as it is not a primary goal of the architecture.
In order to authenticate users for access and billing purposes,
networks use globally unique identifiers. Likewise, the infras-
tructure itself must always know the location of a user in order
to minimize latency when providing connectivity. We briefly
discuss cellular identifiers as well as location information
available from the perspective of the network in this section.
We use acronyms from the 4G LTE architecture; however,
similar entities exist in all generations (2G, 3G, 5G).
User identifiers. There are multiple identifiers that can be
used to associate network usage with a given subscriber. The
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is the iden-
tifier used to gain access to the network when a phone (UE)
performs initial attachment. The IMSI is globally unique, per-
manent, and is stored on the SIM card. Carriers maintain a
HSS database containing the list of IMSIs that are provisioned
for use on the network and subscription details for each.
Given the IMSI’s importance and sensitivity, temporary
identifiers are often used instead. The Globally Unique Tem-
porary Identifier (GUTI) can be thought of as a temporary
replacement for an IMSI. Once a phone attaches to the net-
work, the Mobility Management Entity (MME) generates a
GUTI value that is sent to the UE, which stores the value. The
UE uses the GUTI rather than the IMSI when it attaches to
the network in the future. The GUTI can be changed by the
MME periodically. Prior work recently found that GUTIs are
often predictable with consistent patterns, thus offering little
privacy [31], but this can be remedied with a lightweight fix
that we expect will be used going forward.
User location information. Cellular networks maintain
knowledge of the physical location of each UE. Location
information is necessary to support mobility and to quickly
find the UE when there is an incoming call, SMS, or data
for a user. The mechanism used to locate a UE is known as
“paging” and it relies on logical groupings of similarly located
eNodeB’s known as “tracking areas” (TAs). Each eNodeB is
assigned to a single TA. TAs can be thought of as broadcast
domains for paging traffic. If there is incoming data for an
idle UE, the paging procedure is used, where the network
broadcasts a paging message to all eNodeBs in the user’s
last-known TA. Prior work has shown that the paging mech-
anism can be leveraged by attackers that know an identifier
of the victim (e.g., phone number, WhatsApp ID) to generate
paging messages intended for the victim, which enables an
unprivileged attacker to identify a specific user’s location [42].
Cellular operators also often store location metadata for sub-
scriber, giving them the ability to trace user movement and
location history.
3 Measurement study
In this section we demonstrate the privacy leakage that
exists in today’s cellular architecture by conducting a mea-
surement study while acting as a relatively weak attacker in a
real-world environment. Recall from §2.2 that the IMSI is a
globally unique, permanent identifier. Unfortunately for user
privacy, the traditional cellular architecture uses IMSIs for
authentication and billing, as well as providing connectivity,
causing the IMSI to be transmitted for multiple reasons.
Because of its importance and permanence, the IMSI is
seen as a high-value target for those who wish to surveil
cellular users. For example, in recent years there has been a
proliferation of cell-site simulators, also known as IMSI catch-
ers. These devices offer what appears to be a legitimate base
station (eNodeB) signal. Since UE baseband radios are naïve
and automatically connect to the strongest signal, they at-
tempt to attach to the IMSI catcher and offer their IMSI. IMSI
catchers have been used extensively by law enforcement and
state-level surveillance agencies, with and without warrants,
to identify, track, and eavesdrop on cellular users [52].
Dataset. We analyze a dataset of cellular traces that our team
gathered previously in a large refugee camp over a period
of three days. Details of the trace collection can be found
in [62, 63]. The traces include messages that were sent on
broadcast channels in plaintext for three cellular providers
that offer service in the area. Traces were captured using soft-
ware defined radios and mobile phones. The trace dataset
provides a vantage point that is akin to an IMSI catcher.1
IMSIs are often broadcast in-the-clear. We discover that,
while the architecture is designed to largely use temporary
GUTIs once UEs are connected, IMSIs are often present in
paging messages. Overall we see 588,921 total paging mes-
sages, with 38,917 containing IMSIs (6.6% of all pages). Of
those messages we see 11,873 unique IMSIs. We track the
number of times each individual IMSI was paged and plot a
CDF in Figure 2a. As shown, more than 60% of IMSIs were
paged more than once in the traces. Note that we count multi-
ple pages seen within one second as a single page. Given this
network behavior, even a passive eavesdropper could learn
the permanent identifiers of nearby users.
IMSIs can be tracked over time. Given that IMSIs are reg-
ularly broadcast, an eavesdropper can track the presence or
absence of users over time. We investigate the intervals be-
tween pages containing individual IMSIs. In Figure 2b we
plot a CDF of intervals (greater than one second) between
subsequent pages of individual IMSIs. Overall, we see that
1Trace collection methodology and analysis received IRB approval.
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Figure 2: Analysis of IMSI broadcasts based on cellular traces captured in measurement study.
IMSIs are repeatedly broadcast over time, even though the
design of the architecture should dictate that IMSIs should be
used sparingly in favor of temporary GUTIs.
Individuals can be tracked over time. Given that we can
track IMSIs over time, a passive attacker can track individu-
als’ movements. Figure 2c shows locations of base stations
that broadcast the IMSI for a single user in the traces. As
shown, we saw the user in multiple locations over the course
of two days. Location A was recorded at 10am on a Monday;
location B was thirty minutes later. The user connected to a
base station at location C at noon that same day. Locations D
and E were recorded the following day at noon and 1:30pm,
respectively. From this we see that a passive observer unaffili-
ated with a cellular carrier can, over time, record the presence
and location of nearby users. This attacker is weak, with a
relatively small vantage point. In reality, carriers can and do
maintain this information for all of their users.
4 Scope
We believe that many designs are possible to increase pri-
vacy in mobile networks, and no architecture, today or in the
future, is likely to provide perfect privacy. Nevertheless, below
we discuss various properties that PGPP strives to achieve.
Prior work examined the security vulnerabilities in modern
cell networks [33, 42, 65] and revealed a number of flaws in
the architecture itself. In addition, data brokers and major
operators alike have taken advantage of the cellular architec-
ture’s vulnerabilities to profit off of revealing sensitive user
data. We believe mobile networks should aim to, at a mini-
mum, provide one or both of the following privacy properties.
Identity privacy. A network can aim to protect users’ identity.
Networks—as well as third party attackers—identify users
through IMSIs, which are intended to be uniquely identifying.
Location privacy. A network can aim to protect information
about the whereabouts of a phone.
Naturally, these privacy properties do not exist in isolation;
they intersect in critical ways. For example, attackers often
aim to learn not only who a user is but where a specific user
is currently located, or where a user was when a specific call
was made. Also, the definition of an attacker or adversary is a
complex one, and depending on context may include individu-
als aiming to steal user data, mobile carriers and data brokers
looking to profit off of user data, governments seeking to per-
form bulk surveillance, law enforcement seeking to monitor
a user with or without due process, and many others. Due
to context dependence, we do not expect all privacy-focused
mobile networks to make the same choice of tradeoffs.
4.1 Cellular privacy threat model
Given the above discussion, we distinguish between bulk
and targeted data collection. We define bulk collection to
be the collection of information from existing cellular archi-
tecture traffic without the introduction of attack traffic; thus,
bulk collection is passive. Bulk attacks commonly target user
identities (e.g., IMSIs). PGPP’s core aim is to protect against
bulk attacks. Targeted attacks are active and require injec-
tion of traffic to attack specific targets. Targeted attacks are
often aimed at discovering a victim’s location. We also de-
lineate attacks by the adversary’s capabilities, as they may
have visibility into an entire network (global) versus, for an
unprivileged attacker, some smaller subset of a network’s in-
frastructure (local). Table 1 gives the taxonomy of attacks.
Carriers and governments are the most common global-
bulk attackers. Such bulk surveillance is commonplace in
cellular networks, and has been at the center of recent lawsuits
and privacy concerns. Attacks that employ IMSI catchers or
passively listen to broadcasts using software-defined radios
are considered local-bulk. Here, an IMSI catcher is only able
to monitor phones that connect directly to it, so its visibility
is limited to its radio range. Similarly, SDR-based passive
snooping (as in the example in §3) is only able to monitor
nearby base stations and will miss portions of the network. We
design PGPP with a primary focus on thwarting bulk attacks
by nullifying the value of IMSIs (§5.1).
Local-targeted attacks can be carried out by ordinary users
by generating traffic that causes a network to page a victim
(e.g., phone call to the victim). As local-targeted attackers
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Attack type
Bulk Targeted
V
is
ib
ili
ty Global Carrier logs [18, 19, 39, 71] /
Government Surveillance [9]
Carrier Paging
Local SDR [3, 50, 70] /
IMSI Catcher [37, 52]
Paging attack [34, 42]
Table 1: Common cellular attacks.
do not have visibility into the entire network, they must rely
upon knowledge of the geographic area that is encompassed
by a tracking area. Due to the prevalence of such attacks,
as an enhancement, an operator can provide functionality, in
cooperation with the user, that reduces the efficacy of local-
targeted attacks through the use of TALs (§5.2).
Global-targeted attacks represent a very powerful attacker
who can actively probe a victim while having global visibility
of the network. We envision defenses against such attacks
would require fundamental changes to to communication mod-
els. PGPP does not mitigate global-targeted attacks as we
focus on immediately deployable solutions; we leave this to
future work.
4.2 Aims
Next we discuss the aims of PGPP by considering several
common questions that arise.
What sort of privacy does PGPP provide? As its name
suggests, PGPP aims to provide “pretty good” privacy; we
don’t believe there is a solution that provides perfect privacy,
causes no service changes (i.e., does not increase latency),
and is incrementally deployable on today’s cellular networks.
The main focus is to offer privacy against global-bulk surveil-
lance of mobility and location, a practice by carriers that is
widespread and pernicious. We thwart this via eliminating the
IMSI as an individual identifier and decoupling the authentica-
tion and connectivity mechanisms in the cellular architecture.
Isn’t 5G more secure than legacy generations? We are
currently on the brink of a new generation of cellular con-
nectivity: 5G. While the ITU requirements for what can be
called 5G have not been fully ratified (they are scheduled for
this year), many preliminary components of the standard have
achieved widespread agreement.
Encrypted IMSIs. 5G includes the addition of encrypted
IMSIs, where public key cryptography, along with ephemeral
keys generated on the SIM, is used to encrypt the IMSI when
sending it to the network. This protects user IMSIs from
eavesdroppers. However, encrypted IMSIs do not prevent the
cellular provider itself from knowing the user’s identity. An
analogy for encrypted IMSIs can be found in TLS for web
traffic: eavesdroppers cannot see unencrypted traffic, yet the
endpoints (the web server for TLS, the cellular core in 5G)
can. The goal of this work is to not only thwart local-bulk
attacks, but also protect user privacy from mobile operators
that would otherwise violate it (i.e., global-bulk attacks).
Small cell location privacy. The 5G standard strives for
reduced latencies as well as much higher data throughputs.
This necessitates the use of cells that cover smaller areas in
higher frequency spectrum in order to overcome interference
compared with previous cellular generations that used macro-
cells to provide coverage to large areas. A (likely unintended)
byproduct of 5G’s use of smaller cells is a dramatic reduction
in location privacy for users. As the 5G network provider
maintains state pertaining to the location in the network for
a given user for the purposes of paging, smaller cells result
in the operator, or attacker, knowing user locations at a much
higher precision compared with previous generations.
What about active | traffic analysis | signaling attacks?
While active, targeted attacks aren’t our main focus, we im-
prove privacy in the face of them by leveraging TALs to
increase and randomize the broadcast domain for paging traf-
fic, making it more difficult for attackers to know where a
victim is located (analyzed in §6.2). Further, the goal of many
active attacks is to learn users’ IMSIs, and our nullification of
IMSIs renders such attacks meaningless.
An attacker with a tap at the network edge could use traffic
analysis attacks to reduce user privacy. We largely view this
as out of scope as users can tunnel traffic and use other means
to hide their data usage patterns.
Cellular networks rely on signaling protocols such as Sig-
naling System 7 (SS7) and Diameter when managing mobility
as well as voice and SMS setup and teardown. These protocols
enable interoperability between carriers needed for roaming
and connectivity across carriers. Unfortunately, these proto-
cols were designed with inherent trust in the network players,
and have thus been used to reduce user privacy and disrupt
connectivity [24, 30, 49, 53, 64]. We design PGPP for 4G/5G
data only, which renders legacy SS7 compatibility moot. Our
PGPP design expects users to use outside messaging services
rather than an in-EPC IMS system.
Can PGPP support roaming? Yes. While we envision that
many PGPP users would explicitly not wish to roam, as roam-
ing partners may not provide privacy guarantees, roaming is
possible using a Diameter edge agent that only allows for
home routed roaming, forcing traffic to route from the vis-
ited network’s S-GW back to the PGPP operator’s P-GW,
rather than local breakout due to our authentication mecha-
nism (§5.1). Roaming, and international roaming in particular,
adds billing complexities for the PGPP operator. Typically,
the visited network collects call data records for each roam-
ing user on its network and calculates the wholesale charges
payable by the home network. The visited network then sends
a Transferred Account Procedure (TAP) file to the home net-
work via a data clearing house. The home network then pays
the visited network. In PGPP, the individual identity of the
user that roamed is not known, yet the PGPP operator remains
able to pay the appropriate fees to visited networks.
How does PGPP protect user privacy for voice or text
service? Out of the box, PGPP doesn’t provide protection for
such service. Instead, PGPP aims provide privacy from the
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cellular architecture itself, and in doing so users are free to
use a third party VoIP provider (in which case the phone will
operate identically to a normal phone for telephony service
from a user’s perspective) or use recent systems by Lazar et
al. [44, 45] that provide strong metadata privacy guarantees
for communications, or similar systems such as [16,17,46,69].
We view PGPP as complementary to such systems.
How does PGPP protect users against leaky apps? PGPP
doesn’t, as it is about providing protection in the cellular
infrastructure. Even without leaky apps, users can always in-
tentionally or inadvertently reveal their identity and location.
Leaky apps make this worse as they collect and, sometimes, di-
vulge sensitive user information. We see PGPP as complemen-
tary to work that has targeted privacy in mobile app ecosys-
tems. Further, apps are not as fundamental as connectivity—
users can choose whether to install and run a leaky app, and
can constrain app permissions. However, phones are, by their
nature, always connected to carrier networks, and those very
networks have been selling user data to third parties.
If users can’t be identified by carriers, how can carriers
still make money? We introduce PGPP tokens in §5.1 as a
mechanism for a PGPP operator to charge customers while
protecting user anonymity.
Can’t phone hardware be tracked as well? Phones have an
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). The IMEI
is assigned to the hardware by the manufacturer and identifies
the manufacturer, model, and serial number of a given device.
Some operators keep an IMEI database to check whether a
device has been reported as stolen, known as an equipment
identity register (EIR); IMEIs in the database are blacklisted.
For many devices, the IMEI can be changed through soft-
ware, often without root access. We envision a PGPP MVNO
would allow for subscribers to present their unchanged de-
vice IMEI, giving the PGPP operator the opportunity to check
against a EIR to verify the phone has not been reported as
stolen. At that point, the IMEI could be reprogrammed to a
single value, similar to our changes to the IMSI. Note that
different jurisdictions have different rules about whether, how,
and by whom an IMEI can be changed, so only in some cases
IMEI changes require cooperation with the MVNO.
Is PGPP legal? Legality varies by jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, U.S. law (CALEA [1]), requires providers to offer
lawful interception of voice and SMS traffic. A PGPP-based
MVNO is data-only, with voice and messaging provided by
third parties. CALEA requires the provider to offer content of
communication data at the P-GW, e.g., raw (likely-encrypted)
network traffic. This is supported by PGPP.
5 Design
In this section we describe the mechanisms PGPP em-
ploys to increase user identity and location privacy. Ultimately,
PGPP’s design choices appear obvious in retrospect. We be-
lieve its simplicity is an asset, as PGPP is compatible with
existing networks and immediately deployable.
In order to provide identity privacy against bulk attacks,
we nullify the value of the IMSI, as it is the most common
target identifier for attackers. In our design, we choose to set
all PGPP user IMSIs to an identical value to break the link
between IMSI and individual users. This change requires a
fundamental shift in the architecture, as IMSIs are currently
used for connectivity as well as authentication, billing, and
voice/SMS routing. We design a new cellular entity for billing
and authentication that preserves identity privacy. Fortunately,
the industry push for software-based EPCs makes our archi-
tecture feasible. We describe the architecture in §5.1.
To provide location privacy from targeted attacks, PGPP
leverages an existing mechanism (TALs) in the cellular spec-
ification in order to grow the broadcast domain for control
traffic (§5.2). By changing the broadcast domain for every
user, the potential location of a victim is broadened from the
attacker’s vantage point.
5.1 User identity privacy
As discussed in §2.2, IMSIs are globally unique, permanent
identifiers. As such, they are routinely targeted by attackers,
both legal and illegal. In this section we re-architect the net-
work in order to thwart bulk attacks introduced in §4.1 that
are based on identifying individuals via IMSI.
We decouple back-end connectivity from the authentication
procedure that normally occurs at the HSS when a UE attaches
to the network. Instead, the PGPP operator issues SIM cards
with identical IMSIs to all of its subscribers. In this model,
the IMSI is used only to prove that a user has a valid SIM card
to use the infrastructure and, in turn, the PGPP network can
provide an IP address and connectivity and offer the client a
GUTI, providing the user with a unique identity necessary for
basic connectivity.
LTE authentication is normally accomplished using IMSIs
at the HSS; however, all PGPP users share a single IMSI.
Thus, to authenticate a user, we designed a post-attach oblivi-
ous authentication scheme to ensure that the PGPP operator
is able to account for the user without knowing who they are.
PGPP Gateway. In order to perform this authentication
we create a new logical LTE entity called a PGPP Gateway
(PGPP-GW), which sits between the P-GW and the public
Internet. The P-GW is configured to have a fixed tunnel to a
PGPP-GW, which can be located outside of the PGPP oper-
ator’s network. Using this mechanism, the PGPP-GW only
sees an IP address, which is typically NATed by the P-GW,
and whether that IP address is a valid user. Notably, it does
not have any information about the user’s IMSI. The PGPP-
GW design also allows for many different architectures. For
instance, multiple PGPP-GWs could be placed in multiple
datacenters or even use a privacy service such as Tor.2
Authentication properties. From the perspective of the
PGPP-GW, there are multiple properties an authentication
2We leave exploration into such scenarios to future work.
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Scheme Customer? Anonymous? Unique?
Standard auth •
Group/ring sig • •
Linkable ring sig • •
Cryptocurrency • •
PGPP tokens • • •
Table 2: Three properties needed for user authentication in a
privacy-preserving cell network and schemes to achieve them.
scheme must guarantee: (1) the gateway can authenticate that
a user is indeed a valid customer3; (2) the gateway and/or any
other entities cannot determine the user’s identity, and thus
cannot link the user’s credentials/authentication data with a
user identity; and (3) the gateway can determine whether a
user is unique or if two users are sharing credentials.
As we show in Table 2, the challenge is that standard ap-
proaches for authentication only provide one of the three
required properties and widely-studied cryptographic mech-
anisms only provide two of the three properties. For exam-
ple, an ordinary authentication protocol (of which there are
many [7,36]) can provide property 1) but not 2) and 3). A cryp-
tographic mechanism such as group signatures [8, 12] or ring
signatures [20,59] can protect the user’s identity upon authen-
tication, providing properties 1) and 2), but not 3) as providing
the last property would violate the security of the signature
scheme. Similarly, traitor tracing schemes [14] (such as for
broadcast encryption [25]) can provide all three properties
but in practice cannot provide property 3) as the traitor trac-
ing would require actual physical confiscation of the “traitor”
phone by the MVNO, which is infeasible. A variation on ring
signatures known as linkable ring signatures [48] provides
the ability for a user’s identity to be revealed if the user signs
multiple messages with the same key. While this is useful in
establishing that the user is unique and hasn’t shared their
credentials, it also partially violates the user’s anonymity, as
that key cannot be used again.
Effective authentication. There are two approaches that
we view as viable, depending on the circumstances. An
anonymity-preserving cryptocurrency can provide properties
2) and 3), but not 1) as a cryptocurrency would combine
billing and authentication at the PGPP-GW. For MVNOs
that are not required to know their customers, an anonymity-
preserving cryptocurrency may be the ideal solution for both
user authentication and payment, though even the best coins
provide imperfect anonymity guarantees [38].
To provide all three properties, we develop a simple scheme
called PGPP tokens that helps us sidestep the issues with al-
ternative approaches. The choice of authentication scheme is
deployment-context specific. With PGPP tokens, when pay-
ing a monthly bill a user retrieves authentication tokens that
3Due to “Know Your Customer” rules in some jurisdictions, the provider
may need to have a customer list, necessitating that the user authentication
scheme be compatible with periodic explicit customer billing.
are blind-signed using Chaum’s classic scheme [6, 11] by the
billing system. Later, when authenticating to the service, the
user presents tokens and the service (the PGPP-GW) verifies
their signature before allowing the user to use the network.
The token scheme ensures that the service can check the
validity of tokens without identifying the user requesting ac-
cess. The user then presents the next token in advance so
as to ensure seamless service. Note that PGPP tokens disal-
low the post-pay model for cellular billing, as the network
would be required to know the identity of users in order to
accurately charge them for usage. Therefore, PGPP is pre-pay
only, though this can be adjusted to emulate post-payment
(e.g., users pre-pay for tokens on an ongoing basis rather than
only monthly, and tokens are valid for a longer time period,
such as a year, rather than for only one billing period).
Each token represents a unit of access, as is appropriate
for the service provider. Some providers may choose to offer
flat-rate unlimited-data service, in which case each token
represents a fixed period of time; this is the default approach
that we use to describe the scheme below. Other providers
may choose to offer metered service, in which case each token
represents a fixed unit of data, such as 100 MB or 1 GB, rather
than a period of time. Still others may choose to provide two-
tiered service priority by marking each token with a priority
bit, in addition to either unlimited data or metered data service;
such prioritization does come with slight privacy loss, as the
MVNO and MNO alike would be able to differentiate which
priority level was in use. The privacy loss of two-tiered data
priority can be partially mitigated by offering all users some
amount of time or GB of high-priority service after which
they must fall back to low-priority service; such a service
plan structure is fairly standard in the industry today. In such
a setting, each user would have both high-priority and low-
priority tokens and thus would not be clearly stratified into
two identifiable groups of users.
At the beginning of a billing period, the billing system de-
fines s time slices (e.g., corresponding to hours) or another
unit of access (e.g., a unit of data) and generates s RSA key-
pairs for performing blind signatures using Chaum’s scheme.
It then appends the public keys for this time period to a well-
known public repository that is externally maintained (e.g., on
GitHub), and these are fetched by users. The user generates
s tokens where each token takes the form i‖r where i is the
time slice index as a 256-bit unsigned value zero indexed
from the beginning of the billing period, and r is a 256-bit
random value chosen by the user. The user then blinds these
tokens. The user pays the bill using a conventional means of
payment (e.g., credit card), and presents the blinded tokens to
the billing system to be signed; the system signs each token
with the corresponding time slice key and returns these values
to the user. The user unblinds the response values and verifies
the signatures for each.
Upon later authentication to the service, the user presents
its signed token for the current time slice to the PGPP-GW,
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which verifies the signature and if valid begins forwarding
the user’s traffic onto the Internet. Since the token signature
was generated using Chaum’s scheme, the service cannot
determine which human user corresponds to which signed
token. If the same token is used by two different users during
the same time period then the service can conclude that a user
has shared their credentials and is attempting to cheat.
The costs of this scheme to both the PGPP operator and
the user are low. The operator stores the list of used tokens
in a standard consistent and replicated cloud database, so the
service can operate multiple PGPP-GWs, though it is likely
that a small number of PGPP-GWs can serve a large number
of users: we benchmarked the 2048-bit RSA signature veri-
fication used here at 31µs per call using Crypto++ [21] on a
single core of a 2.6GHz Intel Xeon E5-2640 CPU, and thus
with a single CPU core the PGPP-GW can handle token veri-
fication for tens of millions of users. The tokens themselves
are small and the storage cost to the provider is about 1.5 MB
/ user per time period, which is a small amount for any user’s
phone to store and for a provider even hundreds of millions
of tokens amounts to mere GBs of data in cloud storage.
User device agent. To automate the process of authenti-
cating with the PGPP-GW, we create a simple agent that
runs as background job on the user device. This agent lever-
ages the Android JobScheduler API; in the event of cellular
connectivity, the JobScheduler triggers PGPP-token-based
authentication with the PGPP-GW. The agent establishes a
TLS connection to the PGPP-GW and then sends the token
for the current time slice. Once the user presents a valid to-
ken, the PGPP-GW begins forwarding traffic for that user,
and thus this behavior is akin to a captive portal though the
authentication is automatic and unseen by the user.
5.2 Location privacy
As described in §2.2, cellular operators track user location
in the form of tracking areas for UEs in order to quickly find
users when there is incoming content. PGPP leverages an
existing mechanism in the cellular standard to reduce the
effectiveness of local-targeted attacks described in §4.1.
Paging has been exploited in the past to discover user lo-
cation by adversaries. However, the use of tracking areas is
useful for the cellular provider in that it confines the signal-
ing message load (i.e., paging messages) to a relatively small
subset of the infrastructure. Tracking areas reduce mobility
signaling from UEs as they move through the coverage zone
of a single tracking area. Note that emergency calling rep-
resents a special case in cellular networks. When a device
dials 911, the phone and network attempt to estimate accurate
location information. In this work we do not alter this func-
tionality as we anticipate that users dialing 911 are willing to
reveal their location.
TALs. In PGPP, we exploit the tracking area list (TAL)
concept, introduced in 3GPP Release 8 [2]. Using TALs, a
UE no longer belongs to a single tracking area, but rather
is given a list of up to 16 tracking areas that it can freely
move through without triggering a tracking area update, es-
sentially creating larger tracking areas. Whereas prior work
has focused on using TALs to pre-compute optimal tracking
area combinations for users [56–58], in PGPP, we use TALs
to provide provide improved location anonymity. Typically,
TALs consist of groups of adjacent tracking areas that are
pre-computed, essentially growing the tracking area for a UE
to the union of all tracking areas in the TAL. We do not use
TALs in this way. Instead, we generate TALs on-the-fly and
generate them uniquely for each UE. When a UE attaches
or issues a tracking area update message, the MME learns
the eNodeB and tracking area the UE is currently attached
to. The MME then generates a unique TAL by iteratively
selecting at random some number (up to the TAL limit of 16)
of additional, adjacent tracking areas. By generating unique
TALs for each user, attackers are unable to know a priori
which set of tracking areas (or eNodeBs) that victim is within.
We explore tradeoffs in terms of TAL length, control traffic
overhead, and location anonymity in the next section.
6 Analysis
To study the implications of a PGPP deployment, we create
a simulation to model users, mobility, and cell infrastructure.
We study the impact of PGPP’s design on various cellular at-
tacks that occur today. We then analyze the inherent tradeoffs
from the PGPP operator’s perspective, as improved privacy
comes at the price of increased control traffic. Lastly, we
examine PGPP in a lab testbed on real devices.
6.1 Simulation configuration
eNodeB dataset. We select Los Angeles County, California
as the region for our simulation, which provides a mix of both
highly urban areas as well as rural areas. For eNodeB location
information, we use OpenCellID [43], an open database that
includes tower locations and carrier information. To simplify
the simulation, we select eNodeBs from the database that are
listed as providing LTE from AT&T, the provider with the
most eNodeBs (22,437) in the region.
Given their geographic coordinates, we estimate coverage
areas for every eNodeB using a Voronoi diagram. During the
simulation, a UE is assigned to the eNodeB that corresponds
to the region the UE is located within. While such discretiza-
tion is not likely in reality as UEs remain associated with
an eNodeB based on received signal strength, this technique
provides us with a tractable mobility simulation. A partial
map of the simulation region is shown in Figure 3. ENodeB
regions are shaded based on the tracking area value in the
OpenCellID database.
Mobility traces. To simulate realistic mobility patterns
(i.e., users must follow available paths), we generate mobil-
ity traces using the Google Places [29] and Directions [28]
APIs. First, we use the Places API to find locations in the
simulation region that are available when searching for “post
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Figure 3: Partial simulation map. Cells are shaded by AT&T
LTE tracking area.
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Figure 4: ENodeBs visited by simulated mobile users.
office.” Each place is associated with latitudinal and longitudi-
nal coordinates. We then generate mobility traces by randomly
selecting start and end points, and use the Directions API to
obtain a polyline with coordinates along with estimated times
to reach points along the line. We generate 50,000 mobility
traces: 25,000 cars and 25,000 pedestrians. We then use ns-3
to process the mobility traces and generate coordinates for
each trace at 5-second intervals, in a method similar to [10].
We use this output, along with the eNodeB Voronoi diagram
to assign each simulated UE to an eNodeB for every 5-second
interval in the mobility trace. Figure 4 shows the distribution
of the number of eNodeBs visited by UEs in the simulation.
As expected, car trips result in a significantly higher number
of eNodeBs for a UE compared with pedestrian trips.
Synthetic traffic. We simulate one hour. To create control
traffic, at every 5-second interval we randomly select 5% of
the user population to receive a “call.” A call results in a
paging message that is sent to all eNodeBs in the UE’s track-
ing area. Each paged user enters a 3-minute “call” if it is
not already in one, at which point further paging messages
are suppressed for that user until the call is complete. We
run the simulation with PGPP enabled as well as with the
conventional infrastructure setup.
Custom TAs. As we detail further in §6.3, large TALs in-
crease control traffic loads, which lowers the network’s user
capacity. Therefore, we generate new tracking areas in the
underlying network in order to mitigate the control traffic bur-
den. As tracking areas normally consist of groups of adjacent
eNodeBs, we need a method by which we can cluster nearby
eNodeBs into logical groupings. To do so, we use k-means
clustering with the eNodeB geographic coordinates allowing
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Figure 5: Degree of anonymity using TALs and custom TAs.
for Euclidean distance to be calculated between eNodeBs. We
generate several underlying tracking area maps, with the num-
ber of TAs (i.e., k-means centers) ranging from 25 to 1,000.
For comparison, the AT&T LTE network in the simulation is
composed of 113 TAs.
6.2 Cellular privacy attack analysis
Given the taxonomy we presented in §4.1, we analyze the
identity and location privacy benefits of PGPP in the simulated
environment.
Global-bulk attacks. By nullifying the value of IMSIs, sep-
arating authentication with connectivity, and increasing the
broadcast domain for users, we increase user identity privacy
even with an adversary that is capable of bulk surveillance
over an entire network (e.g., operators, governments).
Anonymity analysis We measure the anonymity of a user
when under bulk attacks using degree of anonymity [22]. The
degree of anonymity value ranges from zero to one, with
ideal anonymity being one, meaning the user could be any
member of the population with equal probability. In this case,
we consider the IMSI value to be the target identity. The size
of the anonymity set for a population of N users will result in
a maximum entropy of:
HM = log2(N) (1)
The degree of anonymity is determined based on the size of
the subset of user identities S that an attacker could possibly
believe the victim to be:
d =
H(X)
HM
=
log2(S)
log2(N)
(2)
Given global visibility into the network, we can reason
about the anonymity set using the number of eNodeBs that
a victim could possibly be connected to. This is because a
cellular carrier can know the exact base station that a user is
connected to once the UE enters an active state. As a baseline,
the anonymity set for traditional cellular is log2(1)log2(22,437) = 0, as
each IMSI is a unique value. With PGPP, IMSIs are identical,
so from the perspective of the carrier, the victim could be
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Figure 6: Area anonymity using TALs and custom TAs.
connected to any eNodeB that has at least one PGPP client
connected to it. Using our simulated environment we collect,
for each paging message, the number of eNodeBs that had
users within their range and use the median value to calculate
the degree of anonymity. Figures 5a and 5b show the degree of
anonymity using different configurations of TALs and custom
TAs, respectively. We see that high degrees of anonymity are
attainable despite an attacker’s global visibility. For instance,
with TALs of length 8, the degree of anonymity is 0.748.
Local-bulk attacks. PGPP’s use of identical IMSIs reduces
the importance of IMSIs, and by extension the usefulness of
local bulk attacks on user identity. An attacker that can view
traffic at the eNodeB(s) can gain insight into nearby IMSIs.
In traditional cell networks, each user has a globally unique
IMSI (S = 1), resulting in a degree of anonymity of zero as
the victim could only be one user. In our measurement study
(§3), we showed that IMSIs are routinely broadcast over cell
networks, making an IMSI catcher or SDR attack powerful.
The subset S in PGPP, on the other hand, is the size of the
population of PGPP users in a given location, as all IMSI
values are identical and a local bulk attacker cannot know
the true identity of a single user. To get an idea of S, we can
calculate the number of PGPP users connected to each eN-
odeB in the simulation. Over the course of the simulation,
we find a mean value of 223.09 users connected to each eN-
odeB that has users, which results in a degree of anonymity
log2(223.09)
log2(50,000)
= 0.50. While this value is somewhat low com-
pared to the ideal value of 1, it is a drastic improvement over
conventional cellular architecture, and is dependent on the
overall user population in the network. As more PGPP users
exist, the degree of anonymity increases.
Local-targeted attacks. In PGPP, local-targeted attacks to
discover a user’s location are diminished in two ways: first,
IMSIs are no longer a useful ID, so identifying an individual
among all users is challenging; and second, we use TALs to
increase the paging broadcast domain for a given UE. From
an attacker’s point of view, this broadens the scope of where
the target UE may be located.
In Figure 6a, we plot the CDF of geographic areas in which
pages are broadcast as we increase TAL lengths using the
base map consisting of 113 tracking areas. We calculate the
area by generating a bounding box around all eNodeBs that
are included in the broadcast domain. As shown, large TALs
result in drastically higher area anonymity compared with
TALs disabled, particularly considering the number of UEs
that could potentially be located in the larger geographic areas.
For instance, the median area for the conventional simulation
is 378.09 km2 whereas TAL lengths of 8 and 16 result in
median areas of 5,876.96 and 9,585.17 km2, respectively.
We analyze anonymity with TALs of length 16 while the
underlying map is varied using custom TAs. Figure 6b shows
our results. We observe that as the number of tracking areas in-
crease, resulting in smaller tracking areas, the area anonymity
decreases. However, despite the decrease, the area anonymity
remains considerably larger than anonymity with TALs dis-
abled as TALs include additional tracking areas. For instance,
the median area for the conventional case is 378.09 km2
whereas the median area for a base map of 500 tracking areas
with TAL 16 is 4891.08 km2, a nearly 13-fold increase from
the perspective of a local targeted attacker.
6.3 Impact of PGPP on network capacity
From an operational perspective, the privacy benefits de-
livered by PGPP must coincide with feasibility in terms of
control overhead in order for it to be deployable. Control traf-
fic determines network capacity in terms of the number of
users that are serviceable in a given area. In this section, we
explore control traffic load when using TALs.
6.3.1 Control overhead with PGPP TALs
We first seek to quantify control message overhead while
we leverage tracking area lists to provide location anonymity
against local-targeted attacks. Recall from §5.2 that we ran-
domly select additional tracking areas from the simulated
coverage area to create TALs, which increases the broadcast
domain for a page. Increased control traffic impacts both eN-
odeBs and MMEs, however, from our experience with real
cellular networks the control traffic capacity at eNodeBs is
the bottleneck as MMEs have much higher capacity. Thus,
we focus on eNodeB control load.
Figure 7a shows a cumulative distribution function (CDF)
for the number of pages broadcast by the simulated eNodeBs.
In the figure, “Conventional” corresponds to disabling TAL
functionality. As expected, larger TAL lengths result in in-
creased control traffic for eNodeBs as they are more likely to
be included in the paging broadcast domain for a given UE.
To gain insight into the control limitations of real eNodeBs,
we consider the capabilities of a Huawei BTS3202E eN-
odeB [32], which is limited to 750 pages per second. When
capacity planning, it is commonplace to budget paging traffic
headroom; accordingly, we estimate the maximum paging
capacity for an eNodeB to be 525 pages per second (70% of
the BTS3202E capacity). This value is depicted in the vertical
red line in the figure (525 pages × 3600 seconds = 1,890,000
pages/hour). The simulation allows us to illustrate the user
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Figure 7: Control traffic and system capacities leveraging
PGPP TALs in the simulated environment.
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Figure 8: Control traffic and system capacities with custom
tracking areas in the simulated environment.
population that could be supported by the network, provided a
population with similar mobility and traffic profiles as defined
in §6.1. Recall that we simulate 50,000 users, both pedestrians
and cars. We consider the paging load for the network and
select the eNodeBs with the maximum paging load, the 95th
percentile, and the median to estimate the number of users
each could theoretically support by taking into account the
max page limitation of the BS3202E. Figure 7b shows the
user capacity as TAL lengths are increased. A TAL length of
one shows the conventional network, as the TAL is composed
of a single tracking area. As expected, larger TALs result in
a reduction in the number of users the eNodeBs can handle
compared with performance when TALs are disabled, due to
increased paging load.
6.3.2 Control overhead with custom tracking areas
As we’ve demonstrated, large TALs result in eNodeBs
with higher control traffic load, effectively reducing the user
capacity the network. To explore whether we can re-gain
control traffic we again consider new, custom tracking area
maps that are generated using k-means where we vary the
number of unique tracking areas in the simulated network.
We run the simulation with various custom tracking area
maps, with all UEs using TAL lengths of 16. The results
are shown in Figures 8a and 8b. We observe that a basemap
Figure 9: PGPP prototype test hardware.
consisting of 25 tracking areas leads to even higher control
traffic compared with the conventional (i.e., AT&T) tracking
area map. A map consisting of more tracking areas results
in TAs with fewer eNodeBs, thus reducing the paging load.
We see that a map of 500 TAs, even with a TAL of length 16,
results in similar paging load compared with the conventional
map with TAL disabled. Correspondingly, the user capacity
of the network with a higher number of tracking areas nears
the conventional capacity from Figure 7b.
6.4 Testbed analysis
We study our PGPP design on a lab testbed in order to
understand potential drawbacks. We implement a software-
based EPC and connect commodity phones to the software-
defined radio-based eNodeB.
Prototype. We create our prototype code on srsLTE [27], an
open-source platform that implements LTE-compliant eN-
odeB and EPC functionality and can be run using software-
defined radios. Our EPC / eNodeB testbed, shown in Figure 9,
consists of an Intel Core i7 machine running Linux and a
USRP B210 radio. We use off-the-shelf commodity phones
(Moto X4, Samsung Galaxy S6, and two OnePlus 5s) with
programmable SIM cards installed to allow the phones to
connect to the PGPP LTE network.
The srsLTE MME maintains EPS mobility management
(EMM) and EPS connection management (ECM) contexts
for connected UEs. The contexts are stored as structs that
include the UE IMSI in a simple key-value store, with the
IMSI serving as the key. When the MME receives S1 appli-
cation protocol (S1AP) messages (e.g., due to mobility), it
looks up the appropriate ECM or EMM contexts to handle
the requests. We add an additional value, a PGPPIMSI, into
the ECM and EMM structs. The PGPPIMSI is generated by
combining the IMSI with a temporary value that is unique to
the individual UE-eNodeB-MME connection. Accordingly,
each UE has a unique PGPPIMSI, which then allows us to
look up the correct context when managing states.
Identical IMSIs and Shared Keys. Given identical IMSI
values for all users, the PGPP attach procedure can result in
additional steps compared with the traditional attach. This
is caused by sequence number synchronization checks dur-
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ing the authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure,
which is designed to allow the UE and the network to authen-
ticate each other. The fundamental issue is that the HSS and
the SIM maintain a sequence number (SQN) value that both
entities increment with each successful attach. As multiple
devices use the same IMSIs, the sequence numbers held at the
HSS and on individual devices will no longer match, causing
an authentication failure (known as a sync_failure). At that
point the UE re-synchronizes with the HSS. We include an
overview figure and details of the procedure in Appendix A.
We explore the delay introduced by sync_failures using our
testbed. Figure 10 shows a PDF of the delays to connection
completion for UEs that hold identical IMSIs and attempt to
authenticate simultaneously. In order to trigger many simulta-
neous authentication requests, we use openairinterface5G [51]
to create 100 simulated UEs. We observe in that the first suc-
cessful UE usually takes roughly 200 ms to connect, while
subsequent UEs that experienced sync_failures experience
additional delays. In our relatively small experiment the UEs
all successfully connect to the network within 1.1 seconds.
In a large-scale production network the number of UEs that
simultaneously attempt to connect would be larger. PGPP-
based networks can mitigate the issue by using more HSSes,
which would reduce the number of UEs that each HSS is re-
sponsible for. Fortunately, the push for 5G will lend itself to
many HSSes as the core network entities are being redesigned
to be virtualized and located nearer to UEs.
7 Related Work
Prior work on anonymous communications often traded off
latency and anonymity [16,17,46,69]. Likewise, Tor [23] and
Mixnets [13] also result in increased latency while improving
anonymity. However, such solutions are inappropriate for cel-
lular systems as, apart from SMS, cellular use cases require
low latency. Additionally, the architecture continues to uti-
lize identifiers (e.g., IMSI) that can expose the user to IMSI
catcher attack or allow for location tracking by the operator.
There has been extensive prior work on finding security
and privacy issues in cellular networks [33,42,47,60,65]. We
decouple the IMSI from the subscriber by setting it to a single
value for all users of the network. Altering the IMSI to specif-
ically thwart IMSI catcher and similar passive attacks has
been previously proposed [4,40,66,68]. These techniques use
pseudo-IMSIs (PMSIs), which are kept synchronized between
the SIM and the HSS, or hypothetical virtual SIMs, allowing
for user identification. We aim to go beyond thwarting IMSI
catchers, and do so while considering active attacks without
requiring fundamental changes on the UE; we protect users
from the operator itself.
Hussain et al. introduce the TORPEDO attack [34], which
allows attackers to identify the page frame index and using
that, the presence or absence of a victim in a paging broad-
cast area (i.e., a tracking area). However, our use of track-
ing area lists to provide additional paging anonymity (§5.2)
increases the location in which a victim could potentially
be, reducing the effectiveness of third-party paging-related
localization attacks. The authors also define the PIERCER
attack, which enables the attacker to reveal a victim’s IMSI
with only their phone number. PGPP nullifies this attack by
making all IMSIs identical. Cellular signaling protocols have
been demonstrated by multiple works to leave users’ privacy
vulnerable to attack [24, 30, 49, 53, 64]. Our initial design
avoids signaling protocol vulnerabilities by providing data-
only rather than voice/SMS, and roaming to other networks
can be enabled by requiring home-routing rather than local
breakout. Hussain et al. identifies a 5G vulnerability that
allows an attacker to neutralize GUTI refreshment in [35].
However, this requires a MiTM attack (e.g., IMSI catcher),
which necessarily means the attacker knows the victim’s loca-
tion. Additionally, the GUTI is a temporary identifier, and is
not associated with a specific user.
Choudhury and Køien alter IMSI values, however both
require substantial changes to network entities [15, 41]. We
argue that a privacy-preserving architecture must be fully
compatible with existing infrastructure as the global telecom
infrastructure is truly a network of networks, comprised of
multiple operators that connect via well-known APIs.
8 Concluding Remarks
User privacy is a hotly contested topic today, especially as
law enforcement organizations, particularly in authoritarian
states, insist upon increasingly ubiquitous surveillance. In ad-
dition, law enforcement has long demanded backdoor access
to private user devices and user data [61].
We do not believe that users of PGPP, in its current form,
would be capable of withstanding targeted legal or extra-legal
attacks by nation-state organizations (e.g., the FBI or NSA),
though PGPP would likely limit the ability of such organi-
zations to continue to operate a regime of mass surveillance
of user mobility. In addition, a more common and problem-
atic form of privacy loss today is due to the surreptitious
sale of user data by network providers; this is a matter PGPP
addresses in a manner that aligns with user autonomy. Our
aim is to improve privacy in line with prior societal norms
and user expectations, and to present an approach in which
privacy-enhanced service can be seamlessly deployed.
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Figure 11: LTE authentication procedure. Given multiple users with identical IMSIs, the sequence number check will fail, causing
multiple attach sequences.
A Sequence number check
When multiple UEs attach to the network using identical
IMSIs, the sequence number check will fail in the network,
triggering synch_failure messages and introducing delay be-
fore successful attachment. Figure 11 shows the message
sequence of the LTE authentication procedure, used today
on most celluar networks, and notes what occurs if duplicate
IMSIs are present.
When a UE sends an attach request, the HSS feeds the
following to its AKA function: a new nonce value RAND, the
shared key K that is stored for the IMSI, and the locally-held
sequence number SQNHSS for that IMSI. The AKA func-
tion generates an authentication token (AUTNHSS) that in-
cludes the SQNHSS, an expected response (XRES), and a key
(KASME) that is ultimately used for UE and MME authentica-
tion. The MME forwards the RAND and the AUTNHSS to the
UE.
The UE then uses its own SQNUE, its shared key K, and
the RAND to generate its own AUTNUE, a response (RES),
and the key (KASME). The UE checks if the AUTNUE and
AUTNHSS match and whether the its SQNUE matches the
SQNHSS in the AUTNHSS. In PGPP, this will fail for most
attach procedures, as individual SIMs will not have the same
SQN value as the HSS for the shared IMSI. When the SQN
check fails the UE will send an authentication failure message
with the cause: sync_failure, along with the UE’s current
SQN which allows the HSS to re-synchronize the SQN value.
The UE then begins the attach sequence again, which will then
succeed as the HSS and UE should begin the attach procedure
with the same SQN values.
B Glossary
AKA
Authentication and Key Agreement. The process by which the
UE and the HSS exchange information by which they can each
verify a secret key held by the other, and calculate keys to be
used for ciphering and integrity protection of data transmitted
between the UE and the network. 11, 16
Diameter
The authentication, authorization, and accounting protocol used
by 4G/5G cellular networks. Diameter is used to enable roam-
ing between modern cellular networks. 5
E-UTRAN
Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network. Network
that serves to connect UEs and eNodeBs. 2
ECM
EPS Mobility Management. The set of routines used by the
core network to manage mobility procedures such as attach
and tracking area updates. 11
EIR
Equipment Identity Register. A database that stores IMEIs of
devices in the LTE systems. IMEIs can be white-listed, grey-
listed or black-listed. The EIR allows a device’s identity to be
checked for blacklisting, (e.g., whether is has been reported
stolen). 6
EMM
EPS Connection Management. The set of routines used by the
core network to manage connectivity between the UE and the
EPC. 11
eNodeB
Evolved NodeB. The base station in LTE. 1–3, 8–11
16
EPC
Evolved Packet Core. The core network in LTE. Main logical
nodes of the EPC are the Packet Data Network Gateway (P-
GW), Serving Gateway (S-GW), the Home Subscriber Server
(HSS), and Mobility Management Entity (MME). 1, 2, 6, 11
GUTI
Globally Unique Temporary Identity. The GUTI is a temporary
identifier that can be used in lieu of an IMSI to identify a
subscriber to the core network. 3, 6, 12
HSS
Home Subscriber Server. The entity that holds subscription
information to allow or deny access to the network. 2, 3, 6, 11,
12, 16
IMEI
International Mobile Equipment Identity. A globally unique,
permanent device identifier which is allocated to each individ-
ual mobile device. It is set by the manufacturer. 6
IMS
IP Multimedia Subsystem. The entity that provides voice and
messaging services for the network. 5
IMSI
International Mobile Subscriber Identity. A globally unique
identifier associated with each mobile phone subscriber. It is
stored in the SIM inside the phone and is sent by the phone to
the network. 3–6, 9–12, 16
MME
Mobility Management Entity. The control entity that manages
signaling between the UE and the core network. MME supports
functions related to bearer and connection management and
manages mobility between eNodeBs. 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 16
MNO
Mobile Network Operator. A cellular service provider. 1, 7
MVNO
Mobile Virtual Network Operator. A cellular operator that does
not necessarily own its own spectrum or all of the network
equipment it operates upon. MVNOs run on top of MNO net-
works. 1, 2, 6, 7
P-GW
Packet Data Network Gateway. The gateway that provides
global IP connectivity from the EPC. The P-GW typically
offers NATed IP addresses. 2, 5, 6
PGPP-GW
PGPP Gateway. A proposed gateway for PGPP that sits be-
tween the P-GW and the global Internet. The PGPP-GW allows
for billing without requiring the user’s identity.. 6–8
RAND
A random nonce used during the authentication procedure. 16
S-GW
Serving Gateway. The serving gateway terminates the inter-
face towards the cellular core and manages EPC signaling in
response to data. Associated UEs are connected to a single
S-GW at any point in time. 2, 5
S1AP
S1 Application Protocol. The signaling protocol used between
the E-UTRAN and the EPC. 11
SIM
Subscriber Identity Module. An entity that holds the IMSI,
which uniquely identifies a subscriber. SIMs are used to au-
thenticate a user to the network. 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 16
SQN
Sequence Number. A value stored at the HSS and the SIM to
maintain synchrony between the entities. 11, 16
SS7
Signaling System 7. The protocol standard used by entities
on public switched telephone networks communicate with
one another. SS7 is used to setup and tear down voice calls,
deliver SMS, etc. SS7 has been largely replaced by Diameter
in modern cellular standards. 5
TA
Tracking Area. A tracking includes one or many eNodeBs.
Typically, the UE can move freely within eNodeBs in a tracking
area without notifying the MME with a tracking area update.
3, 9–11
TAL
Tracking Area List. A list of tracking areas stored on the device
that the device can enter without triggering a tracking area
update. 4–6, 8–11
TAP
Transferred Account Procedure. A file detailing usage and
wholesale charges due to roaming. 5
UE
User Equipment. The mobile device which allows a user to ac-
cess network services, connecting to the UTRAN or E-UTRAN
via the radio interface. Commonly understood to be a mobile
phone. 2, 3, 6, 8–12, 16
XRES
Expected Response. A value generated by the core network
used during the authentication procedure. 16
17
